Upcoming Events

  • סיור של עיר עמים בירושלים(0 أيام)
  • מופע בסלון - עופר גולני(0 أيام)
  • 5th Bil'in Conference(0 أيام)
 

الإبحار

 

Global IMC Network

  • www.indymedia.org
 

MITAAM on Gaza Massacre

نسخة للطباعةنسخة للطباعةSend to friendSend to friendPDF versionPDF version

MITAAM - A Review of Literature and Radical Thought - dedicated part of vol. 18 to testimonies, essays and poetry on the Gaza Massacre.

for details see links:

MITAAM 18:
www.mitaam.co.il/HEBM18.htm

in English:
www.mitaam.co.il/ENGM18.htm

Related

http://www.mitaam.co.il

التعليقات

More likely, Iran is playing games

More likely, Iran is playing games

Re: Re: Re: Report Exposes Chickenhawk LIES on Iran

And your evidence would be ... ?

>The Flaws In the Iran Report

http://www.israelunitycoal ition.org/news/article. php?id=2115

Rarely has a document from the supposedly hidden world of intelligence had such an impact as the National Intelligence
Estimate released this week. Rarely has an administration been so unprepared for such an event. And rarely have vehement critics of the "intelligence community" on issues such as Iraq's weapons of mass destruction reversed themselves so quickly.

All this shows that we not only have a problem interpreting what the mullahs in Tehran are up to, but also a more fundamental problem: Too much of the intelligence community is engaging in
policy formulation rather than "intelligence" analysis, and too many in Congress and the media are happy about it. President Bush may not be able to repair his Iran policy (which was not rigorous
enough to begin with) in his last year, but he would leave a lasting legacy by returning the intelligence world to its proper function.

Consider these flaws in the NIE's "key judgments," which were made public even though approximately 140 pages of analysis, and reams of underlying intelligence, remain classified.

First, the headline finding -- that Iran halted its nuclear weapons program in 2003 -- is written in a way that guarantees the totality of the conclusions will be misread. In fact, there is little substantive difference between the conclusions of the 2005 NIE on
Iran's nuclear capabilities and the 2007 NIE. Moreover, the distinction between "military" and "civilian" programs is highly artificial, since the enrichment of uranium, which all agree Iran is continuing, is critical to civilian and military uses. Indeed, it has always been Iran's "civilian" program that posed the main risk of a nuclear "breakout."

The real differences between the NIEs are not in the hard data but in the psychological assessment of the mullahs' motives and objectives. The current NIE freely admits to having only moderate
confidence that the suspension continues and says that there are significant gaps in our intelligence and that our analysts dissent from their initial judgment on suspension. This alone should give us considerable pause.

Second, the NIE is internally contradictory and insufficiently supported. It implies that Iran is susceptible to diplomatic persuasion and pressure, yet the only event in 2003 that might have
affected Iran was our invasion of Iraq and the overthrow of Saddam
> Hussein, not exactly a diplomatic pas de deux. As undersecretary of
> state for arms control in 2003, I know we were nowhere near
> exerting any significant diplomatic pressure on Iran. Nowhere does
> the NIE explain its logic on this critical point. Moreover, the
> risks and returns of pursuing a diplomatic strategy are policy
> calculations, not intelligence judgments.
>
> The very public rollout in the NIE of a diplomatic strategy exposes
> the biases at work behind the Potemkin village of "intelligence. "
>
> Third, the risks of disinformation by Iran are real. We have lost
> many fruitful sources inside Iraq in recent years because of
> increased security and intelligence tradecraft by Iran. The sudden
> appearance of new sources should be taken with more than a little
> skepticism. In a background briefing, intelligence officials said
> they had concluded it was "possible" but not "likely" that the new
> information they were relying on was deception. These are hardly
> hard scientific conclusions. One contrary opinion came from -- of
> all places -- an unnamed International Atomic Energy Agency
> official, quoted in the New York Times, saying that "we are more
> skeptical. We don't buy the American analysis 100 percent. We are
> not that generous with Iran." When the IAEA is tougher than our
> analysts, you can bet the farm that someone is pursuing a policy
> agenda.
>
> Fourth, the NIE suffers from a common problem in government: the
> overvaluation of the most recent piece of data. In the bureaucracy,
> where access to information is a source of rank and prestige,
> ramming home policy changes with the latest hot tidbit is
> commonplace, and very deleterious. It is a rare piece of
> intelligence that is so important it can conclusively or even
> significantly alter the body of already known information. Yet the
> bias toward the new appears to have exerted a disproportionate
> effect on intelligence analysis.
>
> Fifth, many involved in drafting and approving the NIE were not
> intelligence professionals but refugees from the State Department,
> brought into the new central bureaucracy of the director of
> national intelligence. These officials had relatively benign views
> of Iran's nuclear intentions five and six years ago; now they are
> writing those views as if they were received wisdom from on high.
> In fact, these are precisely the policy biases they had before,
> recycled as "intelligence judgments."
>
> That such a flawed product could emerge after a drawn-out
> bureaucratic struggle is extremely troubling. While the president
> and others argue that we need to maintain pressure on Iran, this
> "intelligence" torpedo has all but sunk those efforts, inadequate
> as they were. Ironically, the NIE opens the way for Iran to achieve
> its military nuclear ambitions in an essentially unmolested
> fashion, to the detriment of us all.
>
> John R. Bolton, a former U.S. ambassador to the United Nations, is
> the author of "Surrender Is Not an Option: Defending America at the
> United Nations and Abroad." He is a senior fellow at the American
> Enterprise Institute.
>

Re: Re: Re: Report Exposes Chickenhawk LIES on Iran

Israel Considering Strike on Iran Despite US Report
https://israel.indymedia.org/newswire/display/8106/index.php#Comment-10919

Random Image

1554_10266533
 

Other Press

أحد 12 December 2010
أحد 24 October 2010
سبت 21 August 2010
ثلاثاء 3 August 2010
More ...
 

تلقيم

لَقِّم المحتوى Features

لَقِّم المحتوى Newswire